



Part-financed by the European
Union (European Regional
Development Fund and European
Neighbourhood and Partnership



Proposal for an analysis framework for River Basin Management Projects

Helle Ørsted Nielsen¹, Anders Branth Pedersen¹, Pia Frederiksen¹, Kaisa Heikkinen², Anne-Mari Rytönen², Seppo Hellsten² & Heli Saarikoski³

1. The National Environmental Research Institute (NERI) at Aarhus University, Denmark
2. The Finnish Environment Institute (SYKE), Finland
3. Helsinki University, Finland

Waterpraxis WP3

Deliverable D3.1b

September 2009



Content

1. Analysing approaches to river basin management planning	3
1.1 Introduction	3
1.2 General background.....	4
1.3 Planning approaches	5
2. Analytical framework regarding institutional set-up	7
2.1 Defining the terms: institutions and institutional analysis.....	7
2.2 Background: theoretical discussions.....	8
2.2.1 Spatial fit and misfit	8
2.2.2 Multilevel governance: hierarchial or polycentric?.....	9
2.2.3 Policy coherence.....	10
2.3 Institutional performance.....	10
2.4 Water Framework Directive and integrated river basin planning.....	12
2.4.1 Vertical institutional setup.....	14
2.4.2 Horisontal institutional setup.....	16
2.4.3 Transboundary institutional setup	17
2.5 How to assess performance of the institutional setup.....	18
2.6 Research questions	19
3. Public participation in River Basin Management Planning	21
3.1 Introduction	21
3.2 Evaluation of public participation processes in general	23
3.3 Evaluation of public participation in RBMPs.....	28
3.4 How to assess public participation	29
3.5 Research questions	33
4. Analysing the river basin management plan	34
Literature.....	39



1. Analysing approaches to river basin management planning

1.1 Introduction

The aim of the Waterpraxis WP3 is to analyse the river basin management plans, to identify barriers and successes in the planning approach, and to distinguish those problems and barriers in the production of a workable plan that differences in planning traditions may invoke. The primary focus of this WP will be the importance of the different types of planning approaches and procedures, institutional structure and interplay, public participation and integration with other policy goals, including climate change issues. Based on this we aim to identify solutions and best practises for subsequent planning, or to suggest changes based on the overall analysis and literature review.

This paper proposes a framework for the analysis of the planning approach, and the processes and procedures, which have been followed in the preparation of the River Basin District Management Plans (RBMPs). Different countries have different policy and planning traditions and -styles. Developed over a range of years, institutional set-up and procedures have been adapted to these. The Water Framework Directive imposes a specific eco-system oriented management approach, which directs planning to the fulfilment of objectives linked to specific water bodies, and an emphasis on the involvement of stakeholders and citizens. Institutional scholars point out that such an eco-system based approach superimposed on an existing institutional set-up for spatial planning and environmental management may create implementation problems due to institutional misfit (Moss 2004). A need for adaptation of procedures, institutional structures and forms of interaction may likely emerge.

We focus on the institutional contexts within which RBMPs are to be developed and implemented and how they have served to support the planning process or on the contrary which barriers in the institutional set-up that can be identified. In this context we have a special focus on the participatory elements and processes, which have been much emphasised in the Directive and Guidance documents. Moreover, the framework encompasses the



content of the resulting plans, asking to which degree and at which level it aims to guide the implementation process and to allocate responsibilities and control.

This framework proposal introduces the purpose of these analyses, outlines some main issues in the theoretical and empirical discussions regarding institutional environment and participatory governance, and suggests criteria and methodologies for how to undertake these analyses in the selected case study river basins. A first draft of the paper was discussed at the WP3 meeting in Roskilde, Denmark June 23 and 24, 2009. Later, as a supplement, a case study guidance note will be developed, which will serve as an explanatory note to the key-questions asked in this framework.

1.2 General Background

The Water Framework Guidance documents refer to the total implementation process as the process of water management (see box 1). This is subsequently divided into two phases: the river basin planning phase and the implementation phase. The river basin planning phase is the process of collecting and analysing river basin data and evaluating and identifying management measures in order to achieve the objectives of the WFD within prescribed timescales (in the box the two phases are illustrated by the red text indicating the end of the planning phase). The river basin planning process is followed by an implementation phase of the programme of measures (European Communities 2003).

Box 1 The different phases in the implementation of the WFD, with the planning phase marked in ‘normal text’ and the implementation phase in *italics*.

- Assessment of the current status and analyse preliminary gaps;
- Setting up of the environmental objectives;
- Establishment of monitoring programmes;
- Gap analysis;
- Setting up of the programme of measures;
- Development of river basin management plans;
- *Implementation of the programmes of measures and prepare the interim report on the implementation;*
- *Evaluation the first and the second period;*
- *Information and consultation of the public, active involvement of interested parties.*



1.3 Planning approaches

Even if the implementation process and elements of the WFD are defined at the general level by the content of the directive, it does not specify organisational structures of the implementation, and there is still scope for variety and differences in the process, reflecting cultural contexts and planning traditions. The CIS guidance document on planning (European Communities 2003) mentions three factors that can serve to distinguish different planning types. They are:

- the way (public and private) stakeholders are involved;
- the way the objectives are set; and
- the types of operational plans that form the outcome of the process.

These factors are closely linked to contemporary discussions in planning theory, where questions of governance and interaction between authorities and stakeholders are central (Irazabal 2009). They point to the degree of involvement and the stages and issues which allow for involvement, and the ways in which involvement takes place.

It is, however, also necessary to look at the way that interaction among different players in the administrative implementing units happens, as this will also influence the planning process. The interaction results from the institutional set-up, including distribution of power, formal rules, as well as informal norms and values related to this interaction and it is relevant to examine whether and how these change to adapt to the WFD implementation. This could be changes in hierarchical structures with well-defined responsibilities and reporting structures, or it could be changes in more loosely defined structures where the projects and tasks influences the way interactions and processes take place. This leads us to define a fourth distinguishing criteria for the planning approach:

- the way institutional interplay is structured and practised

These four main analytical questions are combined into a framework consisting of three parts: a framework for analysis of institutional setup; a framework for analysis of public participation and a framework for analysis of the planning type. Eventually the analysis of public participation could be included in the institutional analysis as stakeholder interests and the manner in which they are incorporated help constitute the institutional setup. The



Part-financed by the European
Union (European Regional
Development Fund and European
Neighbourhood and Partnership



division serves to focus on different aspects of the planning approach, and how data and information on these can be derived.



2. Analytical framework regarding institutional set-up

Although the Water Framework and associated EU legislation is the same for all Member States around the Baltic Sea, the administrative and political systems in which this legislation will be implemented differ considerably and therefore influence the practical implementation of river basin management and planning.

This first part of the analytical framework concerns the institutional environment in which the River Basin Management Plans will be developed and implemented. The institutional analyses must accomplish two purposes 1) to describe and analyse the institutional set-up and 2) outline criteria for evaluating institutional settings with regards to their facilitation of effective water management planning in order to connect the institutional analysis with the identification of best practices.

2.1 Defining the terms: institutions and institutional analysis

Institutional theory follows many paths and the definition of the concept of institutions varies accordingly, but generally institutions are viewed as *regular patterns of action* structured by “rules, norms and shared strategies” (Imperial 1999: 453 citing Crawford and Ostrom 1995). Thus, new institutional analysis focuses on formal rules, informal norms and decision-making procedures which shape interactions and create social practices. This definition implies that a distinction must be made between *organisations* and *institutions*: organisations are actors or acting entities while institutions are the rules and norms that structure their interaction. Yet institutional scholars differ as to how rigorously they uphold this distinction. Thus, Ostrom accepts treating organisations such as government agencies as institutions insofar as organisations are defined by rules, norms and shared strategies (Ostrom 1993, quoted in Imperial). Young et al. argue that organisations are not institutions, but they are key players in institutional setups and they also administer rules that constitute institutional setups (2008: 13). Hence, one way to conceptualise the difference, yet allow for incorporation of organisational units in institutional analysis is to treat institutions as the playing field and organisations as players on that field.



2.2 Background: theoretical discussions

2.2.1 Spatial fit and misfit

With its ecosystem-based management approach the Water Framework Directive represents one of the first examples of EU legislation which explicitly seeks to break with problems of spatial fit, or rather misfit, i.e. a mismatch between the boundaries of a biophysical system and the political-administrative institutions governing them (Moss, 2004; Galaz et al. 2008). The inherent problem with such spatial misfits is that they give rise to externalities, allowing some to enjoy benefits that they have not paid for or subjecting some to negative impacts from activities from which they do not benefit, as in upstream activities impacting downstream environmental conditions. The implication is that decisions may not be based on an adequate consideration of issues and consequences. Furthermore, spatial misfits may lead to a simple lack of coordination and therefore to policy and implementation gaps. Thus ecosystem-based management such as river basin water management has been introduced as a means to overcome spatial boundary problems.

However, studies do not unequivocally support the claim that administrative and ecosystem boundaries should overlap or fit spatially. Moss (2004) examined whether the hierarchical tradition of the German governing institutions and a command-and-control based policy style, both of which clash with the integrated approach of the Water Framework Directive, leads to poor implementation of the directive, as predicted by the spatial fit theory. He found that this was not necessarily the case. In fact, he concluded that matching the spatial structure of governing institutions to the bio-physical boundaries may simply create different boundary problems, i.e. different misfits in which jurisdictions and interests of organised actors overlap and create conflicts. Thus, some governance theorists argue that *interactions among different institutions* matter as much for institutional effectiveness as the structural characteristics and fit of the institution setup (Young et al. 2008; Moss 2004; Gehring and Oberthür 2008). This leads to a focus on institutional interplay, i.e. “interactions among institutional arrangements.... that significantly influence institutional outputs, outcomes and impacts” (Young et al, 2008: xxii).



As the two perspectives are complementary, the analytical framework applied under Waterpraxis will incorporate both perspectives: an analysis that describes institutional structure and evaluates its match with regards to spatial fit combined with an analysis of institutional interplay focusing on interactions among different governing institutions.

2.2.2 Multilevel governance: hierarchical or polycentric?

In addition to the issue of spatial fit, the Water Framework Directive is embedded in a discussion of multi-level governance (MLG), i.e. the allocation of authority across multiple levels of government. In fact the term ‘governance’ in most definitions is conceptualized as distinct from government by an explicit recognition that actors other than governmental entities participate in the political process (see for instance, Ansell 2008). In the EU context governance refers to “the rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level” (European Commission, downloaded 2009). A main argument for dispersion of authority is that it leads to flexible governance (Hooghe and Marks 2003) and higher quality decisions (see section 3.2 of this paper for an elaboration of this discussion).

Hooghe and Marks define two main approaches: which they label Type I MLG and Type II MLG, respectively. Type I consists of general-purpose jurisdictions with non-intersecting memberships and nested institutional arrangements, in the manner of a Russian Doll (2003: 236). The organising principle is hierarchical with one centre. Type II MLG is organised along task-specific jurisdictions with intersecting memberships in the manner of a marble cake. Its organising principle is functional and polycentric.

Institutional design analysts argue as to which form is more effective, but some point out that both forms require coordination although in different forms. The Watersketch analytical framework proceeds without a normative template against which to assess the existing institutional frameworks; but assumes instead that the determination of efficiency is an empirical question analysed through a descriptive approach, mapping out the characteristics and interactions of different institutional setups.



2.2.3 Policy coherence

Finally, the implementation of the water framework directive requires policy coherence, i.e. pursuing multiple objectives and integrating the aims of different sector policies. The WFD implies within its framework the inclusion of water goods (e.g. drinking water, irrigation water) as well as services (e.g. water quality for habitat protection), but policy integration with other sector policies need also to be considered. One example is the integration of spatial planning and water management (see Hedin et al 2007: 36). Hence, in order for water management to be successful, river basin management must coordinate with political-administrative entities related to, but not directly incorporated into the river basin management structure just as these other entities must consider impacts on water management of other policies.

Policy coherence requires both ‘horizontal policy integration’ and ‘vertical policy integration’. Horizontal policy integration refers to cross-sectoral procedures and measures undertaken to mainstream or integrate different sector policies. In contrast, ‘vertical policy integration’ concerns integrative measures and processes between different units within a single sector (Mickwitz et al 2009: 20-21).

2.3 Institutional performance

As is clear institutional theory offers no exact blue print for how to setup effective institutions. However, several frameworks exist that suggest that certain types of institutional features are conducive to effective policy implementation.

Firstly, the concept of institutional capacity invokes the notion of capital or resources that build institutional capacity, i.e. capacity to implement policies effectively. According to Rydin (2006: 26, based on Healey et al 1999), three kinds of capital can be activated in relationships between actors: knowledge resources, relational resources (social capital) and mobilization capacity; together they comprise institutional capacity. Willems & Baumert (2003: 10) present a broader perception of institutional capacity. For instance, a country’s institutional capacity ‘stems more from the *interrelationships* within that country’s institu-



tional system, rather than from particular elements of that system’. Five distinct levels of institutional capacity might be identified (figure 2.1):

Figure 2.1: a holistic view of institutional capacity



Source: Willems & Baumert 2003 (adapted from Segnestam et al 2002).

The performance of individuals is crucial. Individuals must have the motivation, skills and a clear mission, and their number must be adequate for successful performance. But many aspects of individual performance are related to capacity issues at higher levels. For example, a poorly managed organisation can undermine the performance of the individuals (Willems & Baumert 2003: 12). Furthermore, if the involved organisations are having incompatible missions, too few resources etc., the overall institutional capacity may suffer (ibid: 13). Finally, ‘the broader context’ is important too (ibid: 13-15). The broader context relates largely to the institutional issues already discussed above: i) vertical and horizontal coordination among actors such as ministries and organisations, including a management culture of policy integration (networking capacity) ii) public governance – this is the wider institutional context: Is there e.g. political instability in the country? Is it possible for citizens to make their voices heard? Is the civil service independent for political pressure? Is the judiciary effective? iii) social norms, values and practices – is there e.g. a sense of collective responsibility towards the environment. The concept of institutional capacity might for instance explain why the effectiveness of the same measure (e.g. the same public par-



ticipation method) may differ largely in different settings (different RBD's). This indicates a need for a brief description of the RBD's broader national context (political system, tradition for involving the public etc.)

In a different approach, the Institutional Analysis and Development framework associated particularly with Elinor Ostrom focuses on the *costs* associated with interorganisational decision making and implementation, referred to as transaction costs (Imperial 1999 :456). Transaction costs include *information cost*, i.e. the cost of acquiring information including scientific knowledge as well as particular knowledge about the local context. Secondly, inter-organizational decision-making such as that required by multilevel governance and policy integration entail *coordination costs*, (ibid). Coordination costs increase with lack of trust or strong asymmetry in power or basic ideological conflicts or lack of flexibility on the part of some participants. Finally, *strategic costs* occur when participants in the decision arena may gain advantages from without contributing to collective decisions. Such strategic behaviour presents barriers to collaborative decision making.

Transaction costs will not be tabulated as such but will be assessed qualitatively from the analysis. Thus it follows that transaction costs increase if information is not available or not shared, if coordination is complex or requires many participants and when some participants have strategic advantages or disadvantages which hinder cooperation.

2.4 Water Framework Directive and integrated river basin planning


The Water Framework Directive embodies an integrated approach to water management with the river basin as the key spatial organising unit (WFD, Article 3). Integration relates to a wide range of dimensions, including integration across environmental objectives, water resources (surface water, groundwater, freshwater, coastal etc.), water uses, scientific disciplines, water legislation, management, policy measures and decision making levels (Hedin et al, 2007; Frederiksen et al., 2008).

This implies that the river basin districts (RBDs) conceptually sit in the hub of intersecting institutional arrangements, requiring integration across vertical, horizontal and national



administrative boundaries. Figure 2.2 below illustrates the complex institutional setup and the boundary interactions required for river basin planning.

Figure 2.2 Institutional setup for river basin planning



Firstly, river basin districts are nested in a vertical governance structure with the EU at one end and regional or municipal government at the other. The WFD does not specify at what level in this vertical chain RBDs must be set up. In fact, it is possible that a river basin management plan (RBMP) does not fit exactly into a uni-dimensional top-down structure. For instance, Denmark has four river basin districts and the river basin management plans for these four districts will be drawn up by seven local offices under the Ministry of the Environment. Secondly, the RBD and therefore the RBMPs are embedded in a horizontal governance structure, as water management cuts across other policy sectors, most importantly land use planning, nature conservation, climate and agriculture. Thus, coordination problems may arise along both dimensions (Miller 2000; Scharpf 1997; Mickwitz et al 2009). In the vertical dimension coordination issues concern primarily distribution of authority and responsibilities and how this affects implementation of the river basin planning. As for the horizontal dimension, coordination issues relate to how well policy frameworks



and implementation are integrated across sectors. Furthermore, horizontal coordination problems may arise between administrative units within environmental management, if RBMPs do not fit neatly into the vertical jurisdictional structure. Thirdly, some river basin districts cross national borders, creating a need for integration across national and local jurisdictions as well. Thus, vertical, horizontal and transboundary institutional set-ups constitute the key dimensions of the institutional analysis (This follows also Hedin et al. 2007).

2.4.1 Vertical institutional setup

The analysis of the vertical institutional setup aims to provide an overview of the administrative structure in the field of water management, as well as the rules governing their interaction. Table 2.1 lists elements to include in the analysis of the vertical institutional setup, including political-administrative structures and interplay. This is a total list, the inclusion of each element being conditional on available information.

Table 2.1 Elements to be included in institutional analysis of vertical setup

<i>Element</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Method</i>
Political-administrative structure for river basin management	<u>Hierarchical or polycentric structure?</u> Description of structure of river basin management, what government units are involved and how? Description of division of responsibilities among political-administrative units, covering planning, operation and financing. Is there a clear hierarchy or is responsibility divided among several centres? Jurisdictional lines: Are they clearly separated, overlapping or intersecting? Does jurisdiction follow financing responsibilities?	Desk study/ document analysis
Decision-making processes, formal and informal	Who is involved in river basin management? When? With what authority? What information is exchanged among whom?	Documents Interviews with key participants



Degree of centralisation	<p>Identify the primary river basin authority: national or regional/local level.</p> <p>Assessment of the degree of centralisation based on the number of actors involved and the concentration/dispersion of authority.</p> <p>Public participation to be included, but see special section.</p>	Desk study/ document analysis
Spatial fit	<p>Fit or misfit between boundaries of RBM authority and RBM ecosystem.</p> <p>Has RBM been adapted to existing administrative structure or has existing structure been changed to accommodate WFD?</p>	Desk study/ document analysis
Coordinating bodies	<p><u>Existence and mandate of coordinating bodies</u></p> <p>Who participates?</p> <p>What tasks are assigned to coordinating body?</p> <p>What is the role of the coordinating body: advisory or decision making?</p>	Desk study and interviews
Norms	<p>Do participants at different levels of government have similar or different objectives and perceptions about river basin management and about who should participate?</p>	Interviews
Conflict resolution	<p>How are conflicts between participants at different governance levels structure addressed ?</p>	Documents and focus group interviews
Policy instruments	<p>What policy instruments are applied to achieve objectives of river basin management?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Administrative (rules) -Economic (subsidies, taxes, emission trading) -Information -Any other policy instruments? 	Analysis of legislation
Resources	<p>Amount of resources budgeted for RBM</p>	Desk study/document analysis



2.4.2 Horizontal institutional setup

The horizontal analysis focuses on the interaction across policy sectors, drawing up match and mismatch between policy frameworks, i.e. legislation and policy objectives, and outlining synergy or conflict among decision making structures (table 2.2). Conflicts of interest may become clearly defined when different policy objectives are to be integrated. Again, the information may not be available so that each element will be covered in each analysis.

Table 2.2 Elements to include in the institutional analysis of horizontal setup

<i>Element</i>	<i>Issues</i>	<i>Method</i>
Legislative framework	Description of integration of RBM and other <u>planning legislation</u> Outline cross references in other legislation to RBM. Outline possible synergies and /or contradic- tions in policies.	Analysis of legis- lative documents
Political-administrative struc- ture for other policy sectors, e.g. land use planning	Compatibility with river basin planning? Description of the political-administrative structure at the river basin district level for land use planning, agriculture, climate and other relevant policy sectors . Analysis of how these match or conflict with the political-administrative structure of river basin management Describe administrative structures at the river basin district level for agriculture, land use planning and other rele- vant sectors	Desk study/ document analy- sis
Coordination of planning proc- esses	Description of the coordination of RBM and land use planning processes. What coordinating mechanisms exist – fora, processes, and documents? Evaluate degree and character of coordination.	Desk study/document analysis Interviews,
Interests	Analysis of interests of governing units and other stakeholders in relation to river basin	Literature and interviews



	management; assessment of compatibility of or conflict among interests.	
Conflict resolution	Description of mechanisms (if any) for conflict resolution among different administrative structures at the horizontal level.	Document analysis and/or interviews
Norms	Map out perceptions of the status of WFD/river basin management and knowledge about the Directive among decision makers across relevant sectors.	Interviews or survey

2.4.3 Transboundary institutional setup

Finally, the analytical framework includes analysis of the specific issues related to river basins that span national borders (table 2.3). In addition to conflicts of interest and even greater coordination problems these river basins districts may also be affected by different national policy styles.

Table 2.3 Elements to include in the institutional analysis of transboundary setup

<i>Element</i>	<i>Issue</i>	<i>Method</i>
Political-administrative structure	Is the transboundary river basin managed as separate national units or as a single transboundary unit?	Document study
Legislative framework	Identify key sector policies in each country and assess compatibility with transboundary water management. Similarities and differences in key legislation in countries.	Interviews and literature
Norms	Analysis of compatibility of environmental norms and political-administrative norms in countries involved.	Interviews



Policy style	Analysis of policy style in the countries involved and assessment of compatibility. Different or similar policy style (eg. hierarchical vs. participatory; command-and-control, economic instruments or voluntary policy instruments).	Literature
Interests	Identification of sector interests which affect river basin management in each of the countries. Analysis of key issues of conflict among interests.	Interviews
Conflict resolution	Description of conflict resolution bodies (if any).	Document and interviews

2.5 How to assess performance of the institutional setup

The analytical framework applied here does not rest on a normative ideal or theory as to a preferable institutional environment. However, it would be useful to include in each institutional analysis an assessment regarding the effectiveness of the particular institutional setup. The ultimate criterion for the effectiveness of the institutional setup is that it facilitates decisions and actions that achieve the desired policy outcome, in this case good water quality as specified by the water framework directive. However, as there will be a considerable lag time before this can be evaluated, the institutional analysis must instead analyse whether the institutional setup in each case appears to be conducive to effective decision-making, i.e. intermediate criteria (Imperial 1999), as well as identify the main institutional promoters and barriers of effective implementation.

Such intermediate criteria may naturally be taken from the Water Framework Directive, i.e. institutional performance is measured against the objectives of the directive. Thus the directive aims for integration of policy frameworks and institutions assuming that this will lead to better policy formulation and implementation. The analytical framework is explicitly designed to uncover this issue in detail. The actual implementation of decisions is an-



other straightforward performance criteria which can be assessed based on the analyses performed.

More broadly, the background discussion also points to criteria which may guide an assessment of the performance of the institutional setup. Thus, the analysis of the vertical institutional setup revolves around a) structure and spatial fit, b) interplay and coordination and conflict, c) instruments. Regarding spatial fit, the analysis can assess the degree of spatial fit between ecosystem and river basin management structure and may uncover any resulting problems or lack thereof. While most expect problems due to spatial misfit, it is possible that other problems crop up in the case of a high degree of spatial fit. Regarding interplay, the expectation would be that a high degree of coordination and a low degree of conflict will ameliorate the planning and implementation process; Likewise, the degree of inclusions of different stakeholders and decentralisation may lead to flexible governance and high-quality decisions, but this is not certain. On the other hand it could increase large coordination costs. Finally, instruments refer to resources and effective policy instruments necessary to induce behavioural changes among actors in the river basins.

As for the analysis of the horizontal institutional setup the analysis revolves around the issue of policy integration. This may be affected by the fit or misfit of institutional setups in related policy sectors and the mechanisms set up to coordinate integration. Likewise the constellation of actors in different policy fields and the degree of goal conflicts might affect whether implementation of the RBMPs will be effective.

Finally, the analysis of transboundary institutional setup will be assessed by the same criteria as the vertical and horizontal setups, although in much less detail.

Thus, the performance evaluation will be analytical and qualitative based on the descriptions of the institutional setup. It is important to know the functioning of the different elements, but it is equally important to know how the interrelationship between the different parts is working (or not working). In particular, regarding public participation processes which is entitled a specific focus in the Water Framework Directive.



Part-financed by the European
Union (European Regional
Development Fund and European
Neighbourhood and Partnership



2.6 Research questions

It is expected that the case studies of RBMPs in different countries will pave the way for answers to some broader research questions subtracted from the discussions above:

1. Does the multi-level institutional set-up (vertical or horizontal) in RBMP facilitate or hamper decisions and actions that achieve the desired policy outcome?
2. How do *interactions* among different institutions in RBMP affect institutional effectiveness and does interactions matter as much (or more) as the characteristics and fit of individual institutions?



3. Public participation in River Basin Management Planning

Public participation processes are given a specific focus in the Waterpraxis project, because these processes are highlighted in the WFD.

3.1 Introduction

According to some scholars, a fundamental transformation of how we govern has taken place during recent years: from ‘government’ to ‘government and governance’, meaning that there has been a move from primarily state regulation (‘government’) to regulation forms where non-state actors are involved, alongside state actors, to a larger extent than seen before (‘governance’) (Ansell 2008: 460-61). Parallel to this development, the public has been more involved in river district planning, based on a.o. the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention, (Hansen & Mäenpää 2008: 68; see also Trabant Project 2007).

According to the European Commission, the citizens of Europe are entitled a key role in the implementation of the WFD (European Parliament and the Council 2000). Based on the Aarhus Convention, the directive not only calls for the general public to be *informed*, but also directly *involved* in the preparation of RBMP’s (European Commission 2008; the European Parliament and the Council 2003a+b). A prerequisite for directly involvement is that information is provided, before any decisions are made. More specifically, according to art.14 of the WFD, the public should have the opportunity to (European Commission 2008):

- comment on timetables and work programmes (including consultation measures) at least three years before the beginning of the plan.
- have an interim overview of significant water management issues identified at least two years before the beginning of the plan.
- have draft copies of the river basin management plan at least one year before the beginning of the plan.



If requested, access shall be given to background documents and information used for the development of the plan (European Commission 2008). Needless to say, a prerequisite for active public participation is that the RBMP contains the needed information. The public input is supposed to help member states balance environmental, economic and social priorities when doing RBMP's (European Commission 2008).

Furthermore, according to article 14, member states 'shall encourage the active involvement of all interested parties' in the production, review and updating of RBMP's (European Parliament and the Council 2000, art.14). 'Active involvement' can potentially be interpreted as a higher level of participation than 'consultation' (Trabant Project 2007: 12). However, in the vocabulary of the European Commission, there is no strong division between 'consultation' and 'active participation'. Participation is expected to occur through governmental consultation mechanisms directed towards people and stakeholders with an aim of jointly developing solutions to the problems (European Commission 2008):

“Where consultation works well, the public and stakeholders *participate actively* in the development and implementation of river basin plans. This leads to *shared decision-making*, where they become jointly responsible for the outcome of the plan. Active participation in development and shared decision-making are not required by the directive but may be regarded as best practice.” (European Commission 2008: 2, EC's italics).

However, it is a requirement (see above) that active participation of all interested parties is encouraged.

Basically, consultation can be either written or oral (e.g. through an open meeting) (European Commission 2008).

Below, we will apply a broad, and widely accepted, definition of *stakeholder*: 'any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives' (Freeman 1984). Those consulted regarding RBMP's should include all water users, non-governmental organisations (e.g. local and national environmental groups), and other types of stakeholders. In some cases, authorities might want to have separate consultation procedures for sub-basins (European Commission 2008).



According to the WFD, each finalised plan should include a summary of the public consultations and their influence on the plan (European Commission 2008). In other words, a simple list of *who* were consulted is not satisfactory – the plan should also contain qualitative information describing *how* people and stakeholders had an influence on the plan.

3.2 Evaluation of public participation processes in general

In general, there is a ‘paucity of systematic evaluations of real-world applications of participatory processes’ (Burgess & Clark 2009: 159). Therefore, the Waterpraxis project might give an important contribution to the relatively sparse literature on the subject.

Fiorino (1990) (quoted in Burgess & Clark 2009) argued that evaluative criteria are required to assess both instrumental, substantive and normative aspects of public participation processes:

“Instrumentally, participation should help improve the quality of decision-making processes and enhance the legitimacy of the outcomes. Substantively, participation should introduce additional knowledge and values into what have characteristically been expert-dominated decisions. Normatively, participation should ensure stronger democratic processes” (Burgess & Clark 2009: 161) (our italics)

Based on this, it might e.g. be expected, that participation is a tool that ensures that the outcome of the process is more than the sum of the parts. However, the empirical evidence regarding instrumentality provides mixed results. One conclusion of a meta-analysis of 35 cases of local/regional participatory environmental decision-making processes in North America and Western Europe is that participatory forms of environmental governance have the potential to either support or hamper the attainment of sustainability goals (Fritsch & Newig 2009: 22). Fritsch & Newig focus on substantive outcomes rather than fairness or other normative aspects, and investigate whether public participation helped improving the environmental outputs, their implementation and the ecological conditions (ibid: 12). One conclusion is that:



“Remarkably, the influence of participatory and reflexive forms of governance is most evident in settings with external policy goals and/or governmental agenda-setting, while in the opposite cases (no external policy goal, civil society agenda-setting) participation hardly makes any difference for the attainment of sustainable outputs and outcomes” (Fritsch & Newig 2009: 22).

‘External policy goals’ can be interpreted as ‘governmental goals’ in contrast to locally developed goals. Fritsch & Newig also found that most of the 35 cases generated new and useful information, but the information variable was only loosely correlated with process-related variables like participation forms and techniques. Only variables related to ‘type of participants’ showed significant correlations, and here, interestingly, participation of a governmental authority appeared to foster information gain, while inclusion of individual citizens tended to hamper the generation of information. One explanation might be that some of the cases contained very technical issues (difficult to understand for non-experts). On the other hand, ‘collective learning’ was more correlated with process-related variables indicating that e.g. higher degree of stakeholder interaction and more effective communication and information flow foster collective learning among the involved actors (Fritsch & Newig 2009: 12-14). Legitimacy-related variables like e.g. ‘fairness’ appear to influence the willingness of stakeholders to actually cooperate, paving the way for collective learning. Not surprisingly, ‘stakeholder interests’ more than any other variable determined the output, but ‘the predominance of this factor is indeed stunning’ suggesting that ‘regardless of how the process is actually shaped, the societal interests will determine the output’ (ibid: 15). ‘High degree of conflict among relevant parties’ had a negative effect on both the quality of the decisions as well as acceptance variables (ibid: 19).

Regarding the normative dimension of public participation processes, Burgess & Clark (2009: 162) add that (Webler 1995) presents two meta-criteria: 1) *Fairness*: Every participant must be free to attend, to initiate discussions, to discuss, and to decide. Normatively, all those whose interests are affected should have the opportunity of participating. 2) *Competence*: the establishing of the best possible understandings and agreements given what is reasonably knowable – e.g. by giving access to information.



Rowe & Frewer (2000) list nine evaluation criteria for the acceptance and effectiveness of participatory processes (table 3.1). These nine criteria might be regarded as best practice for participatory processes.

Table 3.1. Nine evaluation criteria for the acceptance and effectiveness of participatory processes

Criteria		Description
Public acceptance	1.Representativeness	The public participants should comprise a broadly representative sample of the population of the affected public.
	2.Independence	The participation process should be conducted in an independent, unbiased way.
	3.Early involvement	The public should be involved as early as possible in the process as soon as value judgments become salient.
	4.Influence	The output of the procedure should have a genuine impact on policy.
	5.Transparency	The process should be transparent so that the public can see what is going on and how decisions are being made.
Effectiveness of process	6.Resource accessibility	Public participants should have access to the appropriate resources (information, human, material, time) to enable them to successfully fulfil their brief.
	7.Task definition	The nature and scope of the participation task should be clearly de-



		fined.
	8. Structured decision-making	The participation exercise should use/provide appropriate mechanisms for structuring and displaying the decision-making process.
	9. Cost effectiveness	The procedure should in some sense be cost-effective.

Source: The table is based on Rowe & Frewer (2000: 12-17).

The nine evaluation criteria constitute a framework on which empirical studies might be designed (Rowe & Frewer 2000: 11), although the discussion above indicates that causalities regarding ‘effectiveness’ might be ambiguous. Ridder et al (2005) divide the forms of public involvement in three main categories (table 3.2):

Table 3.2. Forms of public involvement

Informing (forwarding certain information to citizens)	Consulting (merely receiving feedback)	Participation (active cooperation with citizens)
1. Access for citizens to documents (<i>sending documents by e-mail or mail, adding them to homepages, making on the-spot copies in institutions, etc.</i>) 2. Document registries, catalogues, indices 3. Question and answer pages, e.g. on the 4. Internet 5. Official documents, drafts, reports, manuals 6. Public communiqués, press conferences, interviews, speeches and reports 7. Information centre services 8. Brochures, posters, audio-video materials, informational bulletins, and their wide spreading 9. Direct mailing materials, advertisements, newspapers 10. Cooperation with representative organisations of non-profit associations to exchange information, etc.	1. Written consultation 2. Advisory bodies 3. Public hearings 4. Focus groups 5. Interviews 6. Citizen ‘panels’ 7. Company ‘panels’ 8. Workgroups 9. Seminars 10. Conferences 11. Referenda 12. Opinion polling 13. Questionnaires 14. Roundtable conferences	1. Citizen forums 2. Consensus conferences 3. Citizen “courts” 4. Planning cells 5. Visioning 6. Role plays 7. Brainstorming 8. Problem/cause analyses

Source: Ridder et al (2005) in Trabant Project (2007: 38). The forms are described in more detail in the Trabant Project (2007).



It can be added that the recent development of e-Participation systems has potentially widened the toolbox of participation methods in recent years. However, e-Participation methods are not better than standard types of involvement per se. A Danish case study of traffic planning in Northern Denmark showed that the applied e-Participation system did not widen the debate, but narrowed it to ‘middle-age, well-educated males with a higher education and income above average’ (Hansen & Reinau 2006: 81).

Furthermore, Rowe & Frewer (2000: 19-20) expect that the participation forms vary to a different degree on the nine evaluation criteria in table 3.1. E.g. ‘representativeness of participants’ might differ according to the participation form in question. Waterpraxis might add empirical evidence to these expectations. Normatively, probably none of these participation methods can be considered superior to others. The most appropriate participation methods are most likely hybrids of traditional methods (Rowe & Frewer 2000: 24). Ker Rault & Jeffrey (2008: 248) pinpoint that developing a learning approach to public participation might be the key to success.

The Trabant Project (2007) and Hedin et al (2007) offer an empirical starting point for the analyses of public participation processes in some of the countries around the Baltic Sea Basin.

One expectation in Waterpraxis is that in practice, there are large differences in the implementation of the same method in different settings. E.g. a consensus conference regarding one RBMP might be very different from a consensus conference in another RBMP, if there is variation in e.g. the institutional capacities (see figure 2.1, see also Hedin et al 2007). Furthermore, traditions regarding public participation vary between the countries. For example Germany and the Nordic countries are more experienced in public participation than e.g. new EU member states (Hedin et al 2007: 32).

It can be added that the WFD requirements regarding the authorities’ involvement of stakeholders and the general public are interpreted very differently in quite similar countries. For instance, Woods (2008) found that involvement of the general public is planned at a very local level in Scotland and Northern Ireland, while involvement in Wales and the



UK are focused on narrower existing liaison arrangements in place before the WFD was implemented.

In sum, when assessing participatory processes, we are both interested in quantitative and qualitative information. However, in Waterpraxis the qualitative information is given prime priority, because we are interested in identifying best (and worst) practises: *Who* were involved, and *how* were they involved. Were any important actors excluded from participation? Why? In other words, it is of highest importance to qualify the actual involvement of each participant. E.g. there is no guarantee that a stakeholder is heard more in a public advisory committee than in a public hearing. Participation may be symbolic. A variety of contextual and other factors will interact with the characteristics of each participation method to determine the methods effectiveness in the given setting (Rowe & Frewer 2000: 25).

3.3 Evaluation of public participation in RBMP's

To improve public participation in RBMP's the EU HarmoniCOP project studied participative methods used in 15 Member States. The Waterpraxis project might benefit from the experiences of HarmoniCOP. One of the results of HarmoniCOP is an informative handbook for water managers illustrating best practice examples regarding public participation from those 15 countries (Ridder et al 2005).

Of more direct relevance for the Waterpraxis project, the UK HarmoniCOP case study offers an inspiring list of objectives and success measures to evaluate participatory processes. The UK report analyses the public participation process 2003-2004 in the Ribble Basin, UK (Davis & Rees 2004). Davis & Rees (2004) seems to be a good starting point for analysing *who* have been involved and *how* have they been involved, but they could have been clearer on *when*. There are different stages in the development of RBMP's and it is of very high importance to assess public participation at each stage. Furthermore, it can be added that when measuring participation, it is of very high importance to identify possible stakeholders who were excluded from participation in the processes. In doing this, Creightons (1983) criteria for identifying stakeholders might prove valuable in unveiling *who* was involved – and who was not (Creighton (1983) quoted in Hansen & Mäenpää 2008: 71):



1. *Proximity.* Citizens living near where a project or plan is implemented are more vulnerable than people living at longer distances from the new project.
2. *Economic.* Some citizens may experience financial gain or loss depending on their relationship to the new project.
3. *Use.* A new regional plan involving the construction of a motorway may limit some people’s use of a resource or facility due to for example barrier effects.
4. *Social.* A project or policy may threaten a tradition or culture, or it may significantly alter the demographic structure of a community.
5. *Values.* A group may be affected only in terms of how an action relates to its values.

To fulfil the purposes of Waterpraxis more qualitative information is needed, than what will be the result of just copying the HarmoniCOP framework. Below a new evaluation scheme regarding public participation in RBMP’s is suggested – a scheme more focused on providing qualitative information, and less on quantitative information.

3.4.How to assess public participation

An evaluation scheme more focused on providing qualitative information is suggested in table 3.3. The table is inspired by Davis & Rees (2004), by Rowe and Frewers (2000) evaluation criteria, by Fiorinos (1990) evaluation criteria, and by the Trabant Projects (2007: 47) criteria.

Table 3.3. Evaluating public participation processes in RBMP’s with a primary focus on qualitative aspects.

Objective	Indicator	Method
1. All major sectors, interests and geographic areas in the RB have been given the chance of being involved.	1.1 Were all relevant stakeholders given the possibility to participate in the RBMP processes or were relevant stakeholders excluded from participating in the process? If some were excluded: What	Document study, interviews



	types of stakeholders were excluded (e.g. industry, green organisations etc.)	
	1.2 How were relevant stakeholders identified by the authorities?	Document study, interviews
	1.3 What methods were used for reaching stakeholders and citizens?	Document study, interviews
	1.4 When were stakeholders informed of the possibility to participate in the process?	Document study, interviews
	1.5 Did stakeholders choose to get involved? Why? Why not?	Interviews
	1.6 How can stakeholder organisations which participated in the process be classified (which interest group do they represent, how many members do they have, are they local, regional or national organisations, what kind of resources they have, etc. sector, members, resources, objective.....)?	Document study, interviews
	1.7 For stakeholders not being involved and interested in being so: How would they like to be involved?	Interviews
2. Stakeholders were informed of process and role.	2.1 Were interested stakeholders reached with information about the RBMP process and their role in the process?	Document study, interviews
	2.2 Did interested stakeholders understand the process and their role (expected input) in that process.	Interviews
	2.3 What expectations did the stakeholders have regarding their	Interviews



	participation? Were their expectations met?	
3. Stakeholders were <i>actually</i> involved.	3.1 At which phases of the planning process were the stakeholder actually involved.	Document study, interviews
	3.2 For each phase: How was the actual involvement in that particular phase organised? Meetings, hearings, e-tools etc. (see also table 3.2)	Document study, interviews
	3.3 Did stakeholders express opinions/viewpoints etc. during the involvement? Why? Why not?	Document study, interviews
	3.4 Did stakeholders feel free to express opinions during the process? Were there any barriers to open communication? Were these barriers overcome? Why/why not?	Interviews
	3.5 Did the participants feel that the authorities provided sufficient amount of resources (budget, personnel, information, time) to the participation process?	Interviews
	3.6 Was the planning and decision-making process transparent?	Interviews
4. Stakeholders feel that their involvement made a difference for the RBMP.	4.1 Did the stakeholder contribution(s) make a difference? Why? Why not?	Document analysis, interviews
	4.2 Which participation method was most effective? Why?	Interviews
	4.3 Which participation method was most ineffective? Why?	Interviews
5. Stakeholders feel encouraged to participate in implementation of the RBMP.	5.1 Do stakeholders feel encouraged to participate in implementation of the RBMP? Why? Why not?	Interviews
	5.2 a) If yes: Do stakeholders commit themselves to the targets	Interviews



	of the RBMP? b) If not: What changes are needed to make them motivated?	
6. Stakeholders have got a better understanding of the views and stances of other stakeholders. Have they gained knowledge about water protection issues.	6.1 Have the stakeholder, as a result of the process, got a better understanding of other stakeholders' viewpoints? Do they have a better understanding of water protection issues? Any other benefits from the participation?	Interviews
	6.2 Do stakeholders feel that other stakeholders, as a result of the process, have got a better understanding of their viewpoints?	Interviews
	6.3 Will it be easier or more difficult to collaborate with other stakeholders on the background of the RBMP experiences?	Interviews
	6.4 Has participation in the RBMP process lead to more interaction with the same actors in other fields than RBMP? How?	Interviews

Most of the questions are primarily relevant for stakeholders (involved in the process or not). But some of the questions are of relevance for planners as well. It is of high importance to interview some (lower level) planners. For instance, it would be interesting to unveil whether stakeholders and planners have the same opinion on whether stakeholder participation foster or hamper e.g. the flow of information, and the decision-making process in general.

If the broader general public has been involved as well, some of the questions will additionally be relevant for involved citizens.

Specific guidelines for interviewing each target group (stakeholder, planner, citizen) will later be provided in a note. In the note, it will also be addressed, how we identify potential stakeholders who were not given the chance of participating in the RBMP process. The



guidelines should be translated to all the relevant languages – it is very important that the interpretation of the scheme is the same, in each and every country. As indicated in the table, some of the questions will demand a content analysis of documents related to the RBMP, and it has to be supplemented with considerations as to whether all relevant stakeholders were addressed/involved in the process. Most of the indicators may be unveiled through a questionnaire to all stakeholders (both closed and open-ended answers). Depending on the amount of resources for analysing this part of the project it would be very fruitful with in-depth qualitative interviews with selected stakeholders.

Based on the findings described in the above chapters it seems to be very difficult *ex ante* to assess what are best practices regarding participation processes in RBMP's. 'Participation is a wicked process in practice' (Ker Rault & Jeffrey 2008: 241). However, the case studies are expected to give us important information on best (and not to forget) worst practices.

The analysis of public participation processes will focus on the most relevant subject in each country. The countries are in different phases of the implementation process of the WFD, and therefore approaches will be different for different partners. However, the total sum of case studies is expected to constitute a material which may give more general answers to important research questions.

3.5 Research questions

As it appears of chapter 3.2, there is a 'paucity of systematic evaluations of real-world applications of participatory processes' (Burgess & Clark 2009: 159), what paves the way for important contributions from the Waterpraxis project to the literature on the subject. Based on Fiorinos (1990) evaluative criteria, the following important research questions may be unveiled in Waterpraxis:

1. Does public participation in RBMP improve the quality of decision-making processes?
2. Does public participation in RBMP introduce additional knowledge into expert-dominated decisions?



Part-financed by the European
Union (European Regional
Development Fund and European
Neighbourhood and Partnership



3. Does public participation in RBMP ensure a stronger democratic process?

In the WFD there is a strong expectation that public participation per se will provide better decisions. However, as described (chapter 3.2), the empirical evidence shows mixed results. Participatory processes can both support and hamper the attainment of political goals. It is expected that the outcome of participatory processes in RBMP's is dependable on the institutional set-up and the broader national context.



4. Analysing the river basin management plan

According to the guideline (European Communities, 2003) a RBMP will need to contain (a summary) of all the former elements of the planning process, as illustrated in Box 2. This still leaves room for actually ending with very different *types* of plans.

Box 2: Schematic content of the RBMP

- General description of the characteristics of the river basin district, including a map showing the location and boundaries of surface water bodies and groundwater bodies and a map showing the different surface water body types within the river basin.
- Summary of significant pressures and impact of human activity on the status of surface water and groundwater, including estimations of point source pollution, diffuse source pollution (including a summary of land-use) and pressures on the quantitative status of water including abstractions, and an analysis of other impacts of human activity on the status of water.
- Map identifying protected areas.
- Map or the monitoring network.
- Presentation in map of the results of the monitoring programmes showing the ecological and chemical status of surface water, the chemical and quantitative status of groundwater and the status of protected areas.
- List of the environmental objectives established for surface waters, groundwater, and protected areas, including where use has been made of the derogations.
- Summary of the economic analysis of water use.
- Summary of the programme or programmes of measures.
- Register of any more detailed programmes and management plans and a summary of their contents.
- Summary or the public information and consultation measures taken, their results and the changes to the plan as a consequence.
- List of competent authorities.
- Contact points and procedures for obtaining background documentation and information, including actual monitoring data.

The guideline (ibid.) distinguishes four types of plans, according to their visions on planning. The four types of plans are characterised in table 4.1



Table 4.1. The four types of planning distinguished in the Planning Guidance Document. (European Communities, 2003)

Vision on planning	Policy making means:	Participants	Type of plans
1a. plain rational-instrumental	achieving targets with certain means within a certain time.	the problem is defined by the initiating authority; public actors are responsible for the preparation of the plans, private actors can participate during implementation.	spatial-technical imagination of the desired state; implementation following target-means-rationality.
1b. rational-instrumental with an open eye for the complexity of the political, administrative and social context	identifying of sets of related targets and measures, on the basis of an analysis of the actions possible.	the problem is defined by the initiating authority; the analysis of the situation and the preparation of the plans is done in co-operation with several public actors; private actors can participate during implementation.	framework of agreements (who will do what when, what has when to be geared to each other, in which cases must the plan be adjusted); the plan may be incremental (= periodically review of targets and measures, in the light of the target).
2a. plain interactive	policies are the outcome of a process (of learning and negotiating) between interdependent public actors (among themselves) and private actors, each using their own resources.	the definition of the problem is stable if the network of participants is stable; public and private actors both contribute to preparation and implementation of the plans.	picture of the agreed desired target status, in which public as well as private targets are achieved; programme with in any case everybody's tasks and financial inputs.
2b. interactive with an open eye for the power of fundamental debate	on the basis of a powerful discourse, regrouping of actors and means with the aim of achieving certain targets (e.g. 'water service').	the problem is defined by a coalition of public and private actors; a broader audience (public and private) is invited to preparation and implementation of the plans.	review of the activities of public and private actors, in the setting of the discourse; plan with sub-plans for the adjustment of everybody's activities, tasks, responsibilities and financial consequences.

Source: European Communities 2003.

Following this schematic typology, a number of issues crystallize, which can guide the analysis of the member states' resulting plans. The crucial issues in this framework are related to the level of detail in the description of measures and their relation to located targets, the degree that stakeholders are involved in the concrete measures planned, and the



specification of the roles and responsibilities that are allocated to different actors in terms of actions described and financial and technical resources identified and allocated. Moreover, if targets and measures are planned to be revisited, and if there is room for adaptation – and how detailed the implementation phase is foreseen.

Following this, the analysis of the plan will focus on the following questions (table 4.2):

Table 4.2 Analysis of the plan

Issues	key questions	Likely source of information
Plan elements		Plan document, preparatory
Inclusive	Does the plan include all the elements demanded by WFD? If not, why?	plan
Degree of specification/concretisation	Does the plan specify quantitative targets at waterbody/catchment/other level?	plan
	Does the plan describe activities/measures in general or specific terms?	plan
Program of Measures	At which level are measures treated:e.g. a general catalogue, measures in relation to specific problems or measures directed to specific targets and water bodies	plan
	Are suggested activities/tools related to reduction targets?	plan
Prioritization	Are suggested activities/measures prioritized? How?	plan
	Has cost-efficiency of different measures been assessed?	plan
Actors	Is it clear from the plan, who the implementing officers/actors are?	plan
Financial	Are the sources for financing measures clear?	plan
Links	Do the implementing actors have control over financing sources?	plan or interview
Implementation barriers	Hvae any obstacles to implementation been addressed	
	Has land ownership and its importance for the implementation process been considered?	plan
SEA	Is – or will - a strategic environmental assessment carried out?	plan
Policy coherence	Does the plan integrate objectives from other policy domains, including climate? How does it link to Natura 2000 sites?	plan
Timeframe	When is good state planned/expected to be reached?	plan
International planning	Has an international RBMP been produced (or only the national)?	plan or interview



Issues	key questions	Likely source of information
<i>Planning phase elements</i>		<i>Interview</i>
Data availability	Status assessment: were sufficient data available, if not, what was missing, and has steps been taken to collect these data for further process?	Interview with planners
	status assessment: How was pressures identified and how secure are the causal links to state of water?	Interview with planners
Setting up objectives	At which level were targets produced? Who produced the targets?	Interview with planners
Establishment of monitoring programmes and gap analysis	Will the monitoring programmes deliver sufficient data for future planning?	Interview with planners
Setting up programme of measures	Are the measures at hand sufficient to reach the targets?	Interview with planners
Producing the plan	Have the former phases of the planning process provided sufficient data and knowledge?	Interview with planners
toolbox	Have tools and methods been available (e.g databases, models, participation methods, collection and storing of appropriate data	Interview with planners
Financial resources	Are the financial resources sufficient for implementation of planned measures?	
Lessons learned	Which were the main problems encountered in producing the plan	Interview with planners
Long-term vision for the RBD;	Does the plan build on a long-term vision agreed among authorities and stakeholders?	Interview with planners
Feed back	How has the feedback given from stakeholders affected the plan?	Interview with planners

4.1 Research questions

Following this approach the study aims to throw light on following questions:

- a. Are the means for fulfilling the procedures foreseen in the WFD available?
- b. In which ways may the planning types and approaches used in different countries affect the potential outcome?



Literature:

- Ansell, C.K., 2008: 'The governance dilemma' in *European Political Science* vol.7 pp.460-71.
- Burgess, J. & J. Clark, 2009: 'Practitioner evaluations of participatory processes in environmental decision making' in W.N. Adger & A. Jordan (eds.), *Governing Sustainability*, Cambridge University Press.
- Davis, M. & Y. Rees, 2004: *Public Participation in the Ribble River Basin* (case study report produced under work package 5), European Commission, HarmoniCOP.
- European Commission, 2009. *Governance in the European Union: A white paper*. Downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/index_en.htm on July 23 2009, archived on July 31, 2007.
- European Commission, DG Environment, 2008: *A Common Task: Public Participation in River Basin Management Planning* (Water Note 12 – Water Notes on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive).
- European Communities, 2003: *Planning Processes. Common Implementation Strategy for the Water Framework Directive (2006/60/EC)*. Guidance Document No 11.
- European Parliament and the Council, 2000: *Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy*.
- European Parliament and the Council, 2003a: *Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information*.
- European Parliament and the Council, 2003b: *Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in environmental plans and programmes*.
- Fiorino, D.J., 1990: 'Citizen participation and environmental risk: a survey of institutional mechanisms', *Science Technology and Human Values* vol.15, pp.226-43.
- Freeman, R.E., 1984: *Strategic Management: a Stakeholder Approach*; Boston (MA): Pitman Publishing.
- Frederiksen, P., Mäenpää, M. & Hokka, V., 2008: The Water Framework Directive – spatial and institutional integration. *Management of Environmental Quality*, 19,1, pp 100-117.



- Fritsch, O. & J. Newig, 2009: *Participatory governance and sustainability. Findings of a meta-analysis of stakeholder involvement in environmental decision-making*, REFGOV Working Paper Series GPS-13, Centre for Philosophy of Law, Université catholique de Louvain (final version submitted to MIT Press).
- Galaz, V. et al., 2008: “The Problem of Fit among Biophysical Systems, Environmental and Resource Regimes and Broader Governance Systems: Insights and emerging challenges” pp. 147-186 in Young, Oran, King, Leslie and Schroeder, Heike (2008). *Institutions and Environmental Change*. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Gehring, T. and S. Oberthür, 2008: “Interplay: Exploring institutional interaction”, pp. 187-258 in Young, O., King, L. and Schroeder, H., 2008. *Institutions and Environmental Change*. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
- Hansen, H.S. & M. Mäenpää, 2008: ‘An overview of the challenges for public participation in river basin management and planning’ in *Management of Environmental Quality* vol.19 no.1, pp.67-84.
- Hansen, H.S. & K.H. Reinau, 2006: ‘The Citizens in E-Participation’ in M.A. Wimmer et al (eds.), *EGOV*, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, pp.70-82.
- Hedin, S. et al. (2007). *The water framework directive in the Baltic sea region Countries*. Stockholm: Nordregio 2007.
- Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2003: “Unraveling the central state, but how? Types of Multi-level Governance” in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, No. 2, May 2003.
- Imperial, M.T., 1999: “Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework” in *Environmental Management Vol. 24, No. 4*, pp. 449-465.
- Irazabal C., 2009: Realizing Planning’s emancipatory promise: learning from regime theory to strengthen communicative action. *Planning Theory* 8(2), 115-139.
- Ker Rault, P.A. & P.J. Jeffrey, 2008: ‘Deconstructing public participation in the Water Framework Directive: implementation and compliance with the letter or with the spirit of the law?’ in *Water and Environment Journal* vol.22 pp.241-49.
- Mickwitz, P., Aix, F., Beck, S., Carss, D., Ferrand, N., Görg, C., Jensen, A., Kivimaa, P., Kuhlicke, C., Kuindersma, W., Máñez, M., Melanen, M., Monni, S., Pedersen, A.B., Reinert, H., van Bommel, S., 2009, *Climate Policy Integration, Coherence and Governance*, PEER - Partnership for European Environmental Research, Helsinki.



- Miller, G., 2000: "Above Politics: Credible Commitment and Efficiency in the Design of Public Agencies", *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 10: 289-327.
- Moss, T., 2004: "The Governance of land use in river basins: prospects for overcoming problems of institutional interplay with the EU water framework directive". in *Land Use Policy* 21 pp 85-94.
- Ridder, D., E. Mostert & H.A. Wolters (eds.), 2005: *Learning together to manage together – Improving participation in water management*, European Commission, HarmoniCOP.
- Rowe, G. & L. Frewer, 2000: 'Public participation methods: a framework for evaluation', *Science Technology and Human Values* vol.29, pp. 512-56.
- Rydin, Y., 2006, 'Institutions and networks: the search for conceptual research tools' in Y. Rydin & E. Falleth, *Networks and Institutions in Natural Resource Management*, Cheltenham (UK), Northampton (MA): Edward Elgar.
- Scharpf, F.W., 1997: *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*. Boulder, Col: Westview Press.
- Trabant Project, 2007: *Public Participation in Water Management Planning* (Work package III report), Peipsi Center for Transboundary Cooperation.
- Webler, T., 1995: "'Right" discourse in citizen participation: an evaluative yardstick' in O. Renn, T. Webler & P. Widemann (eds.), *Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse*, Kluwer, pp.35-86.
- Willems, S. & K. Baumert, 2003: *Institutional Capacity and Climate Actions*, OECD.
- Woods, D., 2008: 'Stakeholder involvement and public participation: a critique of Water Framework Directive arrangements in the United Kingdom' in *Water and Environment Journal* vol.22, pp.258-64.
- Young, O., King, L. and Schroeder, H., 2008: *Institutions and Environmental Change*. Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology.